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Decision Making and Cooperation Restrictions

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Author Info

  • Slikker, M.

    (Tilburg University)

Abstract

Decision making by various individuals can result in conflicts or cooperation between these individuals. Game theory deals with both the mathematical modeling of these situations of conflict and cooperation and with the analysis of these models using math atical techniques. This thesis focuses on decision making and cooperation restrictions and can roughly be divided into two parts. The first part provides an analysis of cooperative games with exogenously given cooperation structures. Three types of networ representing restricted possibilities to cooperate are distinguished. The second part of this monograph goes one step back and deals with the endogenous formation of cooperation structures. Several models dealing with the formation of all three types o networks are described and analyzed.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-82556.

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Length: 315
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published
Handle: RePEc:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-82556

Note: Dissertation
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Web page: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/

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Cited by:
  1. Jackson, Matthew O., 2005. "Allocation rules for network games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 128-154, April.
  2. Montero, M.P., 2002. "Two-Stage Bargaining with Reversible Coalitions: The Case of Apex Games," Discussion Paper 2002-26, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  3. Slikker, M. & Gilles, R.P. & Norde, H.W. & Tijs, S.H., 2000. "Directed Communication Networks," Discussion Paper 2000-84, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  4. Slikker, Marco & Gilles, Robert P. & Norde, Henk & Tijs, Stef, 2005. "Directed networks, allocation properties and hierarchy formation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 55-80, January.
  5. Robert P. Gilles & Sudipta Sarangi, 2006. "Building Social Networks," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 642, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
  6. Matthew O. Jackson, 2002. "The Stability and Efficiency of Economic and Social Networks," Microeconomics 0211011, EconWPA.
  7. Matthew O. Jackson, 2003. "A Survey of Models of Network Formation: Stability and Efficiency," Game Theory and Information 0303011, EconWPA.
  8. Sudipta Sarangi & Robert P. Gilles, 2004. "The Role of Trust in Costly Network Formation," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 483, Econometric Society.
  9. Gilles, R.P. & Sarangi, S., 2004. "Social Network Formation with Consent," Discussion Paper 2004-70, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.

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