Decision Making and Cooperation Restrictions
AbstractDecision making by various individuals can result in conflicts or cooperation between these individuals. Game theory deals with both the mathematical modeling of these situations of conflict and cooperation and with the analysis of these models using math atical techniques. This thesis focuses on decision making and cooperation restrictions and can roughly be divided into two parts. The first part provides an analysis of cooperative games with exogenously given cooperation structures. Three types of networ representing restricted possibilities to cooperate are distinguished. The second part of this monograph goes one step back and deals with the endogenous formation of cooperation structures. Several models dealing with the formation of all three types o networks are described and analyzed.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-82556.
Date of creation: 2000
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Publication status: Published
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