Protective behavior in games
AbstractThis paper introduces the notion of protective equilibrium in the context of fin ite games in strategic form.It shows that for matrix games the set of protective equilibria equals the set of proper equilibria.Moreover, in the context of bima trix games, the notion of protective behaviour is used as a refinement tool.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-77121.
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Economic Theory (1998) v.78, p.167-175
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