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The MC-value for monotonic NTU-games


Author Info

  • Otten, G.J.M.

    (Tilburg University)

  • Borm, P.E.M.

    (Tilburg University)

  • Peleg, B.

    (Tilburg University)

  • Tijs, S.H.

    (Tilburg University)


The MC-value is introduced as a new single-valued solution concept for monotonic NTU-games. The MC-value is based on marginal vectors, which are extensions of the well-known marginal vectors for TU-games and hyperplane games. As a result of the definition it follows that the MC-value coincides with the Shapley value for TU-games and with the consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games. It is shown that on the class of bargaining games the MC-value coincides with the Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. Furthermore, two characterizations of the MC-value are provided on subclasses of NTU-games which need not be convex valued. This allows for a comparison between the MC-value and the egalitarian solution introduced by Kalai and Samet (1985).

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-77114.

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Date of creation: 1998
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Publication status: Published in International Journal of Game Theory (1998) v.27, p.37-47
Handle: RePEc:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-77114

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Cited by:
  1. Gustavo Berganti?os & Jordi Massó, . "The Chi-Compromise Value For Non-Transferable Utility Games," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 456.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  2. Otten, G.J.M. & Borm, P.E.M. & Tijs, S.H., 1994. "A note on the characterization of the compromise value," Research Memorandum 655, Tilburg University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
  3. Hendrickx, R.L.P., 2002. "Inheritance of Properties in NTU Communication Situations," Discussion Paper 2002-88, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  4. Hendrickx, R.L.P., 2001. "A Note on NTU Convexity and Population Monotonic Allocation Schemes," Discussion Paper 2001-70, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  5. Hendrickx, R.L.P. & Borm, P.E.M. & Timmer, J.B., 2000. "On Convexity for NTU-Games," Discussion Paper 2000-108, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.


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