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On the cores of cooperative games and the stability of the Weber set

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  • Rafels, C.
  • Tijs, S.H.

    (Tilburg University)

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-74454.

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    Date of creation: 1997
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    Publication status: Published in International Journal of Game Theory (1997) v.26, p.491-499
    Handle: RePEc:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-74454

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    Web page: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/

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    Cited by:
    1. Josep Izquierdo & Carles Rafels, 2012. "A characterization of convex TU games by means of the Mas-Colell bargaining set (à la Shimomura)," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 381-395, May.
    2. Francesc Llerena & Carles Rafels, 2013. "Stable sets and max-convex decompositions of TU games," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 313-322, July.
    3. Josep Maria Izquierdo Aznar & Francesc Llerena & Carlos Rafels Pallarola, 2004. "Sequential decisions in allocation problems," Working Papers in Economics 116, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
    4. Jean Derks & Gerard Laan & Valery Vasil’ev, 2010. "On the Harsanyi payoff vectors and Harsanyi imputations," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 68(3), pages 301-310, March.
    5. Josep Maria Izquierdo Aznar & Carlos Rafels Pallarola, 2002. "Coalitionally Monotonic Set-solutions for Cooperative TU Games," Working Papers in Economics 75, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
    6. Francesc Llerena & Carles Rafels, 2007. "Convex decomposition of games and axiomatizations of the core and the D-core," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 603-615, April.
    7. Tijs, S.H. & Brânzei, R. & Ishihara, S. & Muto, S., 2002. "On Cores and Stable Sets for Fuzzy Games," Discussion Paper 2002-116, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.

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