Games with imperfectly observable commitment
AbstractNo abstract is available for this item.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-74216.
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Games and Economic Behavior (1997) v.21, p.282-308
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/
Other versions of this item:
- Damme, E.E.C. van & Hurkens, J.P.M., 1994. "Games with imperfectly observable commitment," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 1994-64, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986.
"On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society,
Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-37, September.
- KOHLBERG, Elon & MERTENS, Jean-François, . "On the strategic stability of equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers RP, UniversitÃ© catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) -716, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- E. Kohlberg & J.-F. Mertens, 1998. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 445, David K. Levine.
- Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 1982. "Persistent Equilibria in Strategic Games," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 515, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Hurkens Sjaak, 1995. "Learning by Forgetful Players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 304-329, November.
- Bagwell, Kyle, 1995.
"Commitment and observability in games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier,
Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 271-280.
- Kyle Bagwell, 1992. "Commitment and Observability in Games," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1014, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Van Damme, Eric, 2002. "Strategic equilibrium," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 41, pages 1521-1596 Elsevier.
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Economists Online Support).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.