Intergenerational Redistribution in Representative Democracies
AbstractAbstract: This thesis deals with political decision making on intergenerational redistributive policies via public debt, public pensions and public investment. Members of different generations have different preferences on these redistributive policies. The resulting intergenerational conflict is resolved in the political process. Using a representative democracy framework, the decision making on these policies is performed by politicians who are chosen to represent the different generations present. Future generations not yet alive are therefore not represented though they may be confronted with the effects of current policy choices. The evolution of public policies due to this political conflict is analysed where the effect of current policy choices on future policy choices is taken into account. Besides, comparisons are made to social welfare maximizing governments and central planners. Also the effects of different sets of policy instruments on the policy choice are analysed.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-73589.
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published
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Web page: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/
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