Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Essays in Industrial Organization and Management Strategy

Contents:

Author Info

  • Bijl, P.W.J. de

    (Tilburg University)

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    Abstract: This thesis contains five essays in the theory of industrial organization and management strategy. An introduction makes the main ideas accessible to non-specialists by presenting the essays as fictitious cases. The first essay investigates strategic disclosure of verifiable information. The disclosed information concerns a hidden action, and the transmission of information takes place in a noisy environment. The second essay explores how search costs and informational asymmetries influence the possibilities for entry in markets for search goods. The model that is used analyzes signaling with common information. The third essay presents a principal-agent model in which the agent enjoys working. The principal, instead of designing a pecuniary incentive scheme, can appeal to the agent's private benefits by giving him a say in the job the agent has to do. The fourth essay applies this idea in order to study the strategic impact of organizational structure. Possible linkages between internal organization and market strategy are highlighted. The last essay focuses on the prices selected by a monopolist who sells a durable good and repairs it in the case of breakdown. The monopolist can circumvent inefficiencies by inviting a competitor in the repair market or by leasing the good instead of selling it.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=125698
    Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 404 Not Found. If this is indeed the case, please notify (Economists Online Support)
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-73588.

    as in new window
    Length: 163
    Date of creation: 1996
    Date of revision:
    Publication status: Published
    Handle: RePEc:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-73588

    Note: Dissertation
    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/

    Related research

    Keywords:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, 1988. "Dynamic Competition with Switching Costs," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 123-137, Spring.
    2. van Damme, Eric, 1989. "Stable equilibria and forward induction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 476-496, August.
    3. Joseph Farrell and Nancy T. Gallini., 1987. "Second-Sourcing as a Commitment: Monopoly Incentives to Attract Competition," Economics Working Papers 8760, University of California at Berkeley.
    4. Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1987. "Optimal Contracts with Lock-In," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt19f324hf, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    5. Andrea Shepard, 1987. "Licensing to Enhance Demand for New Technologies," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 360-368, Autumn.
    6. Russell Cooper & T.W. Ross, 1984. "Product Warranties and Double Moral Hazard," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 716, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    7. Coase, Ronald H, 1972. "Durability and Monopoly," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(1), pages 143-49, April.
    8. Chen, Zhiqi & Ross, Thomas W., 1994. "Why are extended warranties so expensive?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 253-257, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Riyanto, Yohanes E., 2000. "Delegation of authority, managerial initiatives, and the design of divisional structure," CCSO Working Papers 200011, University of Groningen, CCSO Centre for Economic Research.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-73588. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Economists Online Support).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.