Bank risk, bailouts and ambiguity
AbstractThe theoretical analysis in the second part investigates the effect of liquidity assistance and bailouts on bank risk taking and liquidity choice. Furthermore, it explores the possibilities for central banks to create ambiguity about liquidity assistance, thereby influencing bank choices. The results in this thesis have implications for the reform of financial regulation and the safety net. Banks have become more systemically relevant; new regulation has to take this into account. Moreover, a new financial safety net should involve suitable bailout penalties and central banks that can resort to constructive ambiguity to give banks proper incentives.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-5661648.
Date of creation: 2012
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Publication status: Published
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Web page: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-01-07 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2013-01-07 (Banking)
- NEP-CBA-2013-01-07 (Central Banking)
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