Essays in microeconomic theory
AbstractThe fourth paper explains why it might not be welfare maximizing to incentivize doctors to take costs of treatment into account in their prescription decisions. By extending the classic cheap talk model, it is shown that cost incentives reduce the information transmitted from patient to doctor which leads to a welfare loss.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-5556784.
Date of creation: 2012
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Publication status: Published
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Web page: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-07-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2012-07-01 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2012-07-01 (Contract Theory & Applications)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716.
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