Behavioral heterogeneity in economic institutions: An experimental approach
AbstractThe third part, Chapter 6, offers an example of how heterogeneous players affect institutional choices. If players with various costs in cooperation have the opportunity to select an institution that governs them, will they vote for the most efficient institutions? The answer is that it is much harder for them to vote for an ex-post efficient institution compared to a homogenous group studied in the literature. Driven by self-interest, players vote defensively and attempt to avoid possible punishment that might target at themselves.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-5242205.
Date of creation: 2012
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Publication status: Published
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- Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 1974. "Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 201-202, May.
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