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Democracy, populism, and (un)bounded rationality

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  • Binswanger, J.

    (Tilburg University)

  • Prüfer, J.

    (Tilburg University)

Abstract

In this paper we aim to understand how bounded rationality affects performance of democratic institutions. We consider policy choice in a representative democracy when voters do not fully anticipate a politician's strategic behavior to manipulate his reelection chances. We find that this limited strategic sophistication affects policy choice in a fundamental way. Under perfect sophistication, a politician does not make any use of his private information but completely panders to voters' opinions. In contrast, under limited sophistication, a politician makes some use of private information and panders only partially. Limited sophistication crucially determines how welfare under representative democracy compares to welfare under alternative political institutions such as direct democracy or governance by experts. We find that, under limited strategic sophistication, representative democracy is preferable to the other institutions from an ex ante perspective.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-5117897.

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Date of creation: 2012
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Publication status: Published in European Journal of Political Economy (2012) v.28, p.358-372
Handle: RePEc:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-5117897

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Web page: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/

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Cited by:
  1. Binswanger, Johannes & Prüfer, Jens, 2012. "Democracy, populism, and (un)bounded rationality," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 358-372.
  2. Gabriele Gratton, 2013. "Pandering and Electoral Competition," Discussion Papers, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales 2012-22B, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
  3. Schnellenbach, Jan & Schubert, Christian, 2014. "Behavioral public choice: A survey," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 14/03, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..

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