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Monetary and non-monetary punishment in the voluntary contributions mechanism

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  • Noussair, C.N.

    (Tilburg University)

  • Masclet, D.
  • Tucker, S.
  • Villeval, M..C

Abstract

In this paper we replicate and extend the experiment of Fehr and Gaechter (2000) that analyzes the effect of an opportunity to punish others on the level contributions in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-377951.

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Date of creation: 2003
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Publication status: Published in American economic review (2003) v.93, p.366-380
Handle: RePEc:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-377951

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Web page: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/

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  1. Anderson, Simon P. & Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A., 1998. "A theoretical analysis of altruism and decision error in public goods games," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 297-323, November.
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  6. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, . "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," IEW - Working Papers, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich 004, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
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  10. Isaac, R Mark & Walker, James M, 1988. "Communication and Free-Riding Behavior: The Voluntary Contribution Mechanism," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, Western Economic Association International, vol. 26(4), pages 585-608, October.
  11. David Masclet & Charles Noussair & Steven Tucker & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2003. "Monetary and Nonmonetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 366-380, March.
  12. Mari Rege & Kjetil Telle, 2001. "An Experimental Investigation of Social Norms," Discussion Papers, Research Department of Statistics Norway 310, Research Department of Statistics Norway.
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  22. Gachter, Simon & Fehr, Ernst, 1999. "Collective action as a social exchange," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 341-369, July.
  23. Gary E. Bolton & Jordi Brandts & Elena Katok, 2000. "How strategy sensitive are contributions?," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 367-387.
  24. Assar Lindbeck & Sten Nyberg & Jšrgen W. Weibull, 1999. "Social Norms And Economic Incentives In The Welfare State," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 114(1), pages 1-35, February.
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