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Modelling interactive behaviour, and solution concepts


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  • Kleppe, J.

    (Tilburg University)

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    The final chapter of this thesis extensively studies fall back equilibrium. This equilibrium concept is a refinement of Nash equilibrium, which is the most fundamental solution concept in non-cooperative game theory.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-3763576.

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    Length: 264
    Date of creation: 2010
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    Publication status: Published
    Handle: RePEc:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-3763576

    Note: Dissertation
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    Cited by:
    1. Kleppe, J. & Reijnierse, J.H. & Sudhölter, P., 2013. "Axiomatizations Of Symmetrically Weighted Solutions," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 2013-007, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    2. Pedro Calleja & Carles Rafels & Stef Tijs, 2012. "Aggregate monotonic stable single-valued solutions for cooperative games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 41(4), pages 899-913, November.
    3. Pedro Calleja & Carles Rafels & Stef Tijs, 2010. "Aggregate monotonic stable single-valued solutions for cooperative games," Working Papers in Economics, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia 237, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.


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