Modelling interactive behaviour, and solution concepts
AbstractThe final chapter of this thesis extensively studies fall back equilibrium. This equilibrium concept is a refinement of Nash equilibrium, which is the most fundamental solution concept in non-cooperative game theory.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-3763576.
Date of creation: 2010
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-03-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2010-03-06 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2010-03-06 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
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- Kleppe, John & Reijnierse, Hans & Sudhölter, Peter, 2013.
"Axiomatizations of symmetrically weighted solutions,"
Discussion Papers of Business and Economics
3/2013, Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark.
- Kleppe, J. & Reijnierse, J.H. & Sudhölter, P., 2013. "Axiomatizations Of Symmetrically Weighted Solutions," Discussion Paper 2013-007, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Pedro Calleja & Carles Rafels & Stef Tijs, 2010. "Aggregate monotonic stable single-valued solutions for cooperative games," Working Papers in Economics 237, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
- Pedro Calleja & Carles Rafels & Stef Tijs, 2012. "Aggregate monotonic stable single-valued solutions for cooperative games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 41(4), pages 899-913, November.
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