A characterization of the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games
AbstractHerings et al. (2008) proposed a solution concept called the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games. We provide a characterization of the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games. The characteration underlines an important difference, in terms of symmetric treatment of agents, between the average tree solution and the Myerson value (Myerson, 1977) for cycle-free graph games.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-3736838.
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in International Journal of Game Theory (2010) v.39, p.105-111
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Other versions of this item:
- Mishra, D. & Talman, A.J.J., 2009. "A Characterization of the Average Tree Solution for Cycle-Free Graph Games," Discussion Paper 2009-17, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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