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Voluntary R&D cooperation in experimental duopoly markets

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  • Suetens, S.

    (Tilburg University)

Abstract

In the paper I examine in an experiment whether for two different levels of technological spillovers, cooperative R&D behavior voluntarily arises when firms have communication possibilities. It is assumed that in the output market, firms compete `a la Cournot. Experimental results indicate that when technological spillovers are complete and subjects communicate, R&D decisions converge to the cooperative level, while in other cases R&D decisions converge towards the Nash equilibrium.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-3529826.

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Length: 19
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-3529826

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Web page: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/

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  1. Hinloopen, Jeroen, 2000. "Strategic R&D Co-operatives," Research in Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 153-185, June.
  2. Leahy, Dermot & Neary, J Peter, 1997. "Public Policy towards R&D in Oligopolistic Industries," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 87(4), pages 642-62, September.
  3. Eichberger, Jurgen & Kelsey, David, 2002. "Strategic Complements, Substitutes, and Ambiguity: The Implications for Public Goods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 436-466, October.
  4. Amir, Rabah, 2000. "Modelling imperfectly appropriable R&D via spillovers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 18(7), pages 1013-1032, October.
  5. d'ASPREMONT, Claude & JACQUEMIN, Alexis, . "Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers," CORE Discussion Papers RP, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) -823, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  6. Kamien, Morton I & Muller, Eitan & Zang, Israel, 1992. "Research Joint Ventures and R&D Cartels," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1293-306, December.
  7. Cason, Timothy N., 1995. "Cheap talk price signaling in laboratory markets," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 183-204, June.
  8. Petit, Maria Luisa & Tolwinski, Boleslaw, 1999. "R&D cooperation or competition?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 185-208, January.
  9. Henriques, Irene, 1990. "Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 638-40, June.
  10. Charles F. Mason & Owen R. Phillips, 1997. "Information And Cost Asymmetry In Experimental Duopoly Markets," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 79(2), pages 290-299, May.
  11. Ronald Harstad & Stephen Martin & Hans-Theo Normann, 1997. "Experimental Tests of Consciously Parallel Behaviour in Oligopoly," CIE Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics 1997-07, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
  12. R. Cookson, 2000. "Framing Effects in Public Goods Experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 55-79, June.
  13. Sbriglia, Patrizia & Hey, John D, 1994. "Experiments in Multi-stage R&D Competition," Empirical Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 291-316.
  14. Isaac, R. Mark & Reynolds, Stanley S., 1992. "Schumpeterian competition in experimental markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 59-100, January.
  15. Park, Eun-Soo, 2000. "Warm-glow versus cold-prickle: a further experimental study of framing effects on free-riding," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 43(4), pages 405-421, December.
  16. Isaac, R Mark & Reynolds, Stanley S, 1988. "Appropriability and Market Structure in a Stochastic Invention Model," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 103(4), pages 647-71, November.
  17. Friedman,Daniel & Sunder,Shyam, 1994. "Experimental Methods," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521456821.
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