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Legal institutions and financial development

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  • Beck, T.H.L.

    (Tilburg University)

  • Levine, R.

Abstract

Why do some countries have growth-enhancing financial systems, while others do not? Why have some countries developed the necessary investor protection laws and contract-enforcement mechanisms to support financial institutions and markets, while others have not? This paper reviews existing research on the role of legal institutions in shaping financial development.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-3508406.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-3508406

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Web page: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/

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