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Cooperation in experimental games of strategic complements and substitutes

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  • Potters, J.J.M.

    (Tilburg University)

  • Suetens, S.

    (Tilburg University)

Abstract

We conduct a laboratory experiment aimed at examining whether strategic substitutability and strategic complementarity have an impact on the tendency to cooperate in finitely repeated two-player games with a Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibrium. We find that there is significantly more cooperation when actions exhibit strategic complementarities than in the case of strategic substitutes. The difference is to some extent driven by a difference in the speed with which some pairs reach stable full cooperation, but mainly by differences in choices of pairs that do not succeed in reaching full cooperation. Copyright , Wiley-Blackwell.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-3129878.

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Date of creation: 2009
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Publication status: Published in Review of Economic Studies (2009) v.76, p.1125-1147
Handle: RePEc:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-3129878

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Web page: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/

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