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Law and firms' access to finance

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  • Beck, T.H.L.

    (Tilburg University)

  • Demirgüç-Kunt, A.
  • Levine, R.

Abstract

This paper contributes to the literature on how a country's legal origin influences the operation of its financial system by using firm-level survey data on the obstacles that firms face in raising external finance. The paper assesses two channels through which legal origin may influence the financial system. It finds that the adaptability of a country's legal system is more important for explaining the obstacles that firms face in accessing external finance than the political independence of the judiciary.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-3125502.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Publication status: Published in American Law and Economics Review (2005) v.7, p.211-252
Handle: RePEc:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-3125502

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Web page: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/

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