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Technology driven organizational structure of the firm

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  • Brink, J.R. van den

    (Tilburg University)

  • Ruys, P.H.M.

    (Tilburg University)

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-303193.

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Date of creation: 2008
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Publication status: Published in Annals of Finance (2008) v.4, p.481-503
Handle: RePEc:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-303193

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Web page: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/

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  1. Luis Garicano, 2000. "Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(5), pages 874-904, October.
  2. Qian, Yingyi, 1994. "Incentives and Loss of Control in an Optimal Hierarchy," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(3), pages 527-44, July.
  3. Michael Keren & David Levhari, 1979. "The Optimum Span of Control in a Pure Hierarchy," Management Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 25(11), pages 1162-1172, November.
  4. Ruys, P.H.M. & Brink, J.R. van den & Semenov, R., 1999. "Values and Governance Systems," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 1999-66, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  5. Everett, Martin G. & Borgatti, Steve, 1991. "Role colouring a graph," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 183-188, April.
  6. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1988. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics 495, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  7. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1999. "Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 83-114, January.
  8. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Technology, Strategy, and Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 511-28, June.
  9. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 2000. "The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy: A Theory of the Origin and Growth of Firms," NBER Working Papers 7546, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. van den Brink, Rene & Gilles, Robert P., 1996. "Axiomatizations of the Conjunctive Permission Value for Games with Permission Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 113-126, January.
  11. Herbert A. Simon, 1991. "Organizations and Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 25-44, Spring.
  12. Bolton, Patrick & Dewatripont, Mathias, 1994. "The Firm as a Communication Network," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 809-39, November.
  13. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1997. "Power in a Theory of the Firm," NBER Working Papers 6274, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998. "Foundations of Incomplete Contracts," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research 1846, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  15. Gilles, R.P. & Owen, G. & Brink, J.R. van den, 1991. "Games with permission structures: The conjunctive approach," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 1991-14, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  16. Teece, David J., 1996. "Firm organization, industrial structure, and technological innovation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 193-224, November.
  17. Akerlof, George A, 1984. "Gift Exchange and Efficiency-Wage Theory: Four Views," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 79-83, May.
  18. Grossman, Sanford J. & Hart, Oliver D., 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Scholarly Articles 3450060, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  19. George Baker & Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 2002. "Relational Contracts And The Theory Of The Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 117(1), pages 39-84, February.
  20. Pekec, Aleksandar & Roberts, Fred S., 2001. "The role assignment model nearly fits most social networks," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 275-293, May.
  21. Yellen, Janet L, 1984. "Efficiency Wage Models of Unemployment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 200-205, May.
  22. RenÊ van den Brink, 1997. "An Axiomatization of the Disjunctive Permission Value for Games with a Permission Structure," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 27-43.
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Cited by:
  1. René Brink & Chris Dietz, 2014. "Games with a local permission structure: separation of authority and value generation," Theory and Decision, Springer, Springer, vol. 76(3), pages 343-361, March.

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