On 'informationally robust equilibria' for bimatrix games
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-195638.
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Economic Theory (2007) v.30, p.539-560
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Other versions of this item:
- Hans Reijnierse & Peter Borm & Mark Voorneveld, 2007. "On ‘Informationally Robust Equilibria’ for Bimatrix Games," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 539-560, March.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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