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Simple priorities and core stability in hedonic games

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Author Info

  • Dimitrov, D.A.

    (Tilburg University)

  • Borm, P.E.M.

    (Tilburg University)

  • Hendrickx, R.L.P.

    (Tilburg University)

  • Sung, S.C.

Abstract

In this paper we study hedonic games where each player views every other player either as a friend or as an enemy.Two simple priority criteria for comparison of coalitions are suggested, and the corresponding preference restrictions based on appreciation of friends and aversion to enemies are considered.It turns out that the first domain restriction guarantees non-emptiness of the strong core and the second domain restriction ensures non-emptiness of the weak core of the corresponding hedonic games.Moreover, an element of the strong core under friends appreciation can be found in polynomial time, while finding an element of the weak core under enemies aversion is NP-hard.We examine also the relationship between our domain restrictions and some su.cient conditions for non-emptiness of the core already known in the literature.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-194178.

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Date of creation: 2006
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Publication status: Published in Social Choice and Welfare (2006) v.26, p.421-433
Handle: RePEc:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-194178

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Web page: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/

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  1. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Jackson, Matthew O., 2002. "The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 201-230, February.
  2. Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi & Tayfun Sonmez, 1999. "Core in a Simple Coalition Formation Game," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 449, Boston College Department of Economics.
  3. Burani, Nadia & Zwicker, William S., 2003. "Coalition formation games with separable preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 27-52, February.
  4. Herbert E. Scarf, 1965. "The Core of an N Person Game," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 182R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  5. Antonio Romero-Medina & Katari´na Cechlárová, 2001. "Stability in coalition formation games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 487-494.
  6. Ballester, Coralio, 2004. "NP-completeness in hedonic games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 1-30, October.
  7. José Alcalde & Pablo Revilla, 2003. "Researching with Whom? Stability and Manipulation," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2003/35, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
  8. Dreze, J H & Greenberg, J, 1980. "Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 987-1003, May.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Dinko Dimitrov & Shao Chin Sung, 2006. "A Taxonomy of Myopic Stability Concepts for Hedonic Games," Working Papers 2006.10, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  2. Dinko Dimitrov & Shao-Chin Sung, 2008. "Computational Complexity in Additive Hedonic Games," Working Papers 2008.98, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  3. Iehlé, Vincent, 2007. "The Core-Partition of Hedonic Games," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/87, Paris Dauphine University.
  4. repec:lmu:muenec:6431 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Alison Watts, 2006. "Formation of Segregated and Integrated Groups," Working Papers 2006.127, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  6. Shao Sung & Dinko Dimitrov, 2007. "On Myopic Stability Concepts for Hedonic Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 62(1), pages 31-45, February.
  7. Carmelo Rodríguez Álvarez, 2006. "Strategy-Proof Coalition Formation," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2006/11, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
  8. Dimitrov, D.A. & Sung, S.C., 2004. "Enemies and Friends in Hedonic Games: Individual Deviations, Stability and Manipulation," Discussion Paper 2004-111, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  9. José Alcantud & Ritxar Arlegi, 2012. "An axiomatic analysis of ranking sets under simple categorization," SERIEs, Spanish Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 227-245, March.
  10. Kleinberg, Jon & Ligett, Katrina, 2013. "Information-sharing in social networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 702-716.
  11. Dinko Dimitrov & Shao Chin Sung, 2011. "Size Monotonicity and Stability of the Core in Hedonic Games," Working Papers 2011.52, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  12. Woeginger, Gerhard J., 2013. "A hardness result for core stability in additive hedonic games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 101-104.
  13. Iehle, Vincent, 2007. "The core-partition of a hedonic game," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 176-185, September.
  14. Karakaya, Mehmet, 2011. "Hedonic coalition formation games: A new stability notion," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 157-165, May.
  15. Alison Watts, 2007. "Formation of segregated and integrated groups," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 505-519, April.

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