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Compromise solutions based on bankruptcy

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Author Info

  • Quant, M.

    (Tilburg University)

  • Borm, P.E.M.

    (Tilburg University)

  • Hendrickx, R.L.P.

    (Tilburg University)

  • Zwikker, P.

Abstract

In this paper we introduce a new family of compromise solutions for the class of compromise admissible games.These solutions extend bankruptcy rules.In particular, we show that the compromise extension of the run-to-the-bank rule coincides with the barycentre of the core cover and characterise this rule by consistency.We also provide a characterisation of the TAL-family of rules.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-193649.

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Date of creation: 2006
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Publication status: Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (2006) v.51, p.247-256
Handle: RePEc:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-193649

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Web page: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/

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References

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  1. MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D. & VILLAR, Antonio, . "The TAL-family or rules for bankruptcy problems," CORE Discussion Papers RP, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) -1897, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. Maschler, M & Potters, J A M & Tijs, S H, 1992. "The General Nucleolus and the Reduced Game Property," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 85-106.
  3. Quant, M. & Borm, P.E.M. & Reijnierse, J.H. & Velzen, B. van, 2003. "The core cover in relation to the nucleolus and the Weber set," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 2003-55, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  4. Muto, S. & Nakayama, M. & Potters, J.A.M. & Tijs, S.H., 1988. "On big boss games," Open Access publications from Tilburg University, Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154246, Tilburg University.
  5. Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July.
  6. Tijs, S.H. & Lipperts, F.A.S., 1982. "The hypercube and the core cover of N-person cooperative games," Open Access publications from Tilburg University, Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154285, Tilburg University.
  7. O'Neill, Barry, 1982. "A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 345-371, June.
  8. Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August.
  9. Maschler, M. & Potters, J.A.M. & Tijs, S.H., 1992. "The general nucleolus and the reduced game property," Open Access publications from Tilburg University, Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154217, Tilburg University.
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Cited by:
  1. Tijs, Stef & Borm, Peter & Lohmann, Edwin & Quant, Marieke, 2011. "An average lexicographic value for cooperative games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 213(1), pages 210-220, August.
  2. William Thomson, 2013. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update," RCER Working Papers 578, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  3. Arantza Est�vez-Fern�ndez & Mar�a Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro & Manuel Alfredo Mosquera & Estela S�nchez- Rodr�guez, 2012. "A Bankruptcy Approach to the Core Cover," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute 12-012/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  4. repec:dgr:uvatin:2012012 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. A. Estévez-Fernández & M. Fiestras-Janeiro & M. Mosquera & E. Sánchez-Rodríguez, 2012. "A bankruptcy approach to the core cover," Computational Statistics, Springer, Springer, vol. 76(3), pages 343-359, December.
  6. Lohmann, E.R.M.A. & Borm, P.E.M. & Quant, M., 2007. "A Stroll with Alexia," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 2007-52, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.

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