Endogenous preemption on both sides of a market
AbstractWe study a market in which both buyers and sellers can decide to preempt and set their quantities before market clearing.Will this lead to preemption on both sides of the market, only one side of the market, or to no preemption at all?We find that preemption tends to be asymmetric in the sense that it is restricted to only one side of the market (buyers or sellers).
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-192941.
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Economics Letters (2006) v.93, p.126-131
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Other versions of this item:
- Wieland Müller & Werner Güth & Jan Potters & Susanne Büchner, 2005. "Endogenous preemption on both sides of a market," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2005-25, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
- Güth, W. & Müller, W. & Potters, J.J.M., 2005. "Endogenous Preemption on Both Sides of a Market," Discussion Paper 2005-92, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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