The Market for Corporate Control and Corporate Governance Regulation in Europe
AbstractThe two main constituents of any corporate governance system are corporate governance regulation and the market for corporate control. Their impact on economic growth, the development of markets, and the governance of firms has been widely studied both theoretically and empirically. However, empirical research in this field remains mostly confined to the UK and US and there is little known about the effects of takeover market and corporate legislation in Continental Europe. This dissertation provides a comprehensive overview of the market for corporate control and corporate governance regulation in European countries and documents their evolution during the past 15 years. The overview is complimented with the analysis of the impact of corporate takeovers and regulatory environment in European countries on companies’ profitability and the choice of financing sources. We show that there are substantial differences between Anglo-American and Continental European markets for corporate control and legal systems and these differences have significant impact on economic growth, the development of markets, and the governance of firms.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-191850.
Date of creation: 2006
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Publication status: Published
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