Congestion network problems and related games
AbstractThis paper analyzes network problems with congestion effects from a cooperative game theoretic perspective.It is shown that for network problems with convex congestion costs, the corresponding games have a non-empty core.If congestion costs are concave, then the corresponding game has not necessarily core elements, but it is derived that, contrary to the convex congestion situation, there always exist optimal tree networks.Extensions of these results to a class of relaxed network problems and associated games are derived.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-175063.
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in European Journal of Operational Research (2006) v.172, p.919-930
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Web page: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/
Other versions of this item:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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- Kleppe, J. & Reijnierse, J.H., 2007. "Public Congestion Network Situations, and Related Games," Discussion Paper 2007-58, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Trudeau, Christian, 2009. "Network flow problems and permutationally concave games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 121-131, July.
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