Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Optimal Enforcement of Competition Law

Contents:

Author Info

  • Motchenkova, E.

    (Tilburg University)

Abstract

Despite the recent theoretical developments in the field of antitrust law enforcement, much still needs to be done in order to prevent collusion and price-fixing in the major indiustries. Although penalties were recently increased considerably and new instruments of cartel deterrence such as leniency programs, were introduced, still complete deterrence of antitrust law violations has not been achieved. This thesis contributes to the solution of the problem of optimal competition law enforcement. We approach this problem from the angle of possible refinements of current penalty schemes for violations of competition law. In particular, we determine the optimal combination of instruments such as the amount of the fine and the rate of law enforcement, and the optimal structure and design of leniency programs. In the thesis, the main features of current penalty systems are modeled employing the tools of game theory, dynamic games, and dynamic optimization. We stress the importance of the dynamic analysis of competition law enforcement, since it captures better both the current antitrust rules and the crime process in general. Application of the above-mentioned tools allows us to compare current US and EU penalty schemes for violations of antitrust law and to develop policy implications on how existing penalty schemes can be modified in order to increase their deterrence power.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=46963
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 404 Not Found. If this is indeed the case, please notify (Economists Online Support)
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-172252.

as in new window
Length: 192
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published
Handle: RePEc:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-172252

Note: Dissertation
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/

Related research

Keywords:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Buccirossi, Paolo & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2006. "Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers," CEPR Discussion Papers 5465, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-172252. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Economists Online Support).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.