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Burning money and (pseudo) first-mover advantages: An experimental study on forward induction

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  • Huck, S.
  • Müller, W.

    (Tilburg University)

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-171348.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Publication status: Published in Games and Economic Behavior (2005) v.51, p.109-127
Handle: RePEc:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-171348

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Web page: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/

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References

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  1. Amershi, A.H. & Sadanand, A.B. & Sadanand, V., 1989. "Manipulated Nash Equilibria - Ii: Some Properties," Working Papers, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance 1989-5, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
  2. Nagel, Rosemarie, 1995. "Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1313-26, December.
  3. van Damme, Eric, 1989. "Stable equilibria and forward induction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 476-496, August.
  4. Guth, Werner & Huck, Steffen & Muller, Wieland, 2001. "The Relevance of Equal Splits in Ultimatum Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 161-169, October.
  5. Nachbar, J H, 1990. ""Evolutionary" Selection Dynamics in Games: Convergence and Limit Properties," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 59-89.
  6. Kenneth Clark & Stephen Kay & Martin Sefton, 1997. "When Are Nash Equilibria Self-Enforcing? An Experimental Analysis," Experimental, EconWPA 9707001, EconWPA.
  7. E. Kohlberg & J.-F. Mertens, 1998. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 445, David K. Levine.
  8. repec:fth:guelph:1989-5 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. Van Huyck John B. & Battalio Raymond C. & Beil Richard O., 1993. "Asset Markets as an Equilibrium Selection Mechanism: Coordination Failure, Game Form Auctions, and Tacit Communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 485-504, July.
  10. Miguel Costa-Gomes & Vincent P. Crawford & Bruno Broseta, . "Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games:An Experimental Study," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of York 00/45, Department of Economics, University of York.
  11. Schotter Andrew & Weigelt Keith & Wilson Charles, 1994. "A Laboratory Investigation of Multiperson Rationality and Presentation Effects," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 445-468, May.
  12. Guth, Werner & Huck, Steffen & Rapoport, Amnon, 1998. "The limitations of the positional order effect: Can it support silent threats and non-equilibrium behavior?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 313-325, February.
  13. Georg Weizsäcker, 2003. "Ignoring the rationality of others: evidence from experimental normal-form games," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library 507, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  14. Joseph Farrell, 1987. "Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Entry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(1), pages 34-39, Spring.
  15. Cachon, Gerard P & Camerer, Colin F, 1996. "Loss-Avoidance and Forward Induction in Experimental Coordination Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 111(1), pages 165-94, February.
  16. Brandts, Jordi & Holt, Charles A., 1995. "Limitations of dominance and forward induction: Experimental evidence," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 391-395, October.
  17. Amershi, A.H. & Sadanand, A.B. & Sadanand, V., 1989. "Manipulated Nash Equilibria - I: Forward Induction And Thought Process Dynamics In Extensive Form," Working Papers, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance 1989-4, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
  18. Russell Cooper & Douglas V. DeJong & Robert Forsythe & Thomas W. Ross, 1989. "Communication in the Battle of the Sexes Game: Some Experimental Results," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(4), pages 568-587, Winter.
  19. Cooper, Russell & Douglas V. DeJong & Robert Forsythe & Thomas W. Ross, 1993. "Forward Induction in the Battle-of-the-Sexes Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1303-16, December.
  20. Balkenborg, Dieter, 1994. "An Experiment on Forward- versus Backward Induction," Discussion Paper Serie B, University of Bonn, Germany 268, University of Bonn, Germany.
  21. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, December.
  22. Cooper, Russell & De Jong, Douglas V. & Forsythe, Robert & Ross, Thomas W., 1992. "Forward induction in coordination games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 167-172, October.
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Cited by:
  1. Andreas Blume & Peter H. Kriss & Roberto A. Weber, 2011. "Pre-Play communication with forgone costly messages: experimental evidence on forward induction," ECON - Working Papers, Department of Economics - University of Zurich 034, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Sep 2014.
  2. Jordi Brandts & Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness, 2007. "Forward induction and entry deterrence: an experiment," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 183-209, October.
  3. Anders Poulsen & Michael Roos, 2010. "Do people make strategic commitments? Experimental evidence on strategic information avoidance," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 206-225, June.
  4. Seel, Christian & Wichardt, Philipp C., 2012. "How burning money requires a lot of rationality to be effective," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 111-113.
  5. Martin Dufwenberg & Gunnar Köhlin & Peter Martinsson & Haileselassie Medhin, 2014. "Thanks but No Thanks: A New Policy to Reduce Land Conflict," CESifo Working Paper Series 4864, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. Souza, Filipe & Rêgo, Leandro, 2012. "Mixed Equilibrium: When Burning Money is Rational," MPRA Paper 43410, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Andreas Blume, 2011. "The Dog That Did Not Bark: Pre-Play Communication with Foregone Costly Messages," Working Papers, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics 438, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2011.
  8. Anders U. Poulsen & Michael V. M. Roos, 2009. "Do People Make Strategic Moves? Experimental Evidence on Strategic Information Avoidance," Discussion Papers 09-06, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  9. Poulsen, Anders, 2007. "Learning to Make Strategic Moves: Experimental Evidence," MPRA Paper 10927, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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