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A relation between perfect equilibria in extensive form games and proper equilibria in normal form games

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  • Damme, E.E.C. van

    (Tilburg University)

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    File URL: http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=26682
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154427.

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    Date of creation: 1984
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    Publication status: Published in International Journal of Game Theory (1984) v.13, p.1-13
    Handle: RePEc:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154427

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    Web page: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/

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    Cited by:
    1. Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2009. "Axiomatic Equilibrium Selection for Generic two-player games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000231, David K. Levine.
    2. Wilson, Robert B. & Govindan, Srihari, 2007. "On Forward Induction," Research Papers 1955, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    3. Fudenberg, Drew & Kreps, David M. & Levine, David K., 1988. "On the robustness of equilibrium refinements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 354-380, April.
    4. DEMICHELIS, Stefano & RITZBERGER, Klaus, 2000. "From evolutionary to strategic stability," CORE Discussion Papers 2000059, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    5. Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2005. "Justification of Stable Equilibria," Research Papers 1896, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    6. Stefano Demichelis & Klaus Ritzberger & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 2004. "The simple geometry of perfect information games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 315-338, 06.
    7. Perea,Andrés, 2003. "Proper Rationalizability and Belief Revision in Dynamic Games," Research Memorandum 048, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    8. Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson, . "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," ELSE working papers 011, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
    9. Carlos Pimienta & Jianfei Shen, 2011. "On the Equivalence between (Quasi)-perfect and sequential equilibria," Discussion Papers 2012-01, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    10. Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2006. "Sufficient Conditions for Stable Equilibria," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000267, UCLA Department of Economics.
    11. Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2005. "Refinements of Nash Equilibrium," Research Papers 1897, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.

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