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The Nash bargaining solution is optimal

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  • Damme, E.E.C. van

    (Tilburg University)

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    File URL: http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=26680
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154426.

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    Date of creation: 1986
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    Publication status: Published in Journal of Economic Theory (1986) v.38, p.78-100
    Handle: RePEc:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154426

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    Web page: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/

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    Cited by:
    1. HERRERO, Carmen & MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D. & PONTI, Giovanni, 2006. "On the adjudication of conflicting claims: an experimental study," CORE Discussion Papers 2006062, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    2. Trockel,W., 2001. "Can and should the Nash program be looked at as a part of mechanism theory?," Working Papers 322, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
    3. Joan Esteban & Jozsef Sakovics, 2005. "A theory of agreements in the shadow of conflict," ESE Discussion Papers 139, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    4. Joan Esteban & Jozsef Sakovics, 2004. "Why do lions get the lion's share? A Hobbesian theory of agreements," ESE Discussion Papers 37, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    5. Anbarci, Nejat & Sun, Ching-jen, 2013. "Robustness of intermediate agreements and bargaining solutions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 367-376.
    6. Walter Trockel, 1999. "On the Nash Program for the Nash Bargaining Solution," UCLA Economics Working Papers 788, UCLA Department of Economics.
    7. Walter Trockel, 2002. "Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 27-43.
    8. Iñigo Iturbe-Ormaetxe Kortajarene & Luis Corchón, 1997. "A proposal to unify some concepts in the theory of fairness," Working Papers. Serie AD 1997-21, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    9. Carmen Herrero, 2000. "The Three Musketeers. Old Solutions to Bankruptcy Problems," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0609, Econometric Society.
    10. Claus-Jochen Haake & Walter Trockel, 2007. "On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules," Working Papers 393, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.

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