Alternating bid bargaining with a smallest money unit
AbstractIn a seminal paper, Ariel Rubinstein has shown that impatience implies determinateness of the 2-person bargaining problem. In this note we show that this result depends also on the assumption that the set of alternatives is a continuum. If the pie can be divided only in finitely many different ways, (for example, because the pie is an amount of money and there is a smallest money unit), any partition can be obtained as the result of a subgame perfect equilibrium if the time interval between successive offers is sufficiently small.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154420.
Date of creation: 1990
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Games and Economic Behavior (1990) v.2, p.188-201
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Other versions of this item:
- Van Damme, Eric & Selten, Reinhard & Winter, Eyal, 1990. "Alternating bid bargaining with a smallest money unit," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 188-201, June.
- Damme, E.E.C. van & Selten, R. & Winter, E., 1989. "Alternating bid bargaining with a smallest money unit," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 1989-32, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Erik van Damme & Reinhard Selten & Eyal Winter, 1989. "Alternating Bid Bargaining with a Smallest Money Unit," Discussion Paper Serie A, University of Bonn, Germany 253, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Van Damme, E. & Selten, R. & Winter, E., 1989. "Alternating Bid Bargaining With A Smallest Money Unit," Papers, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research 8932, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1984. "Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1351-64, November.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society,
Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
- Sobel, Joel & Takahashi, Ichiro, 1983. "A Multistage Model of Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(3), pages 411-26, July.
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