Risk sensitivity, independence of irrelevant alternatives and continuity of bargaining solutions
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154284.
Date of creation: 1983
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (1983) v.4, p.295-300
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Web page: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/
Other versions of this item:
- de Koster, R. & Peters, H. J. M. & Tijs, S. H. & Wakker, P., 1983. "Risk sensitivity, independence of irrelevant alternatives and continuity of bargaining solutions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 295-300, July.
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- Eric van Damme, 1984. "The Nash Bargaining Solution is Optimal," Discussion Papers 597, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Ross Cressman, Maria Gallego, 2005.
"On the Ranking of Bilateral Bargaining Opponents,"
eg0043, Wilfrid Laurier University, Department of Economics, revised 2005.
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