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The compromise value for NTU-games

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Author Info

  • Borm, P.E.M.

    (Tilburg University)

  • Keiding, H.
  • McLean, R.P.
  • Oortwijn, S.
  • Tijs, S.H.

    (Tilburg University)

Abstract

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154213.

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Date of creation: 1992
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in International Journal of Game Theory (1992) v.21, p.175-189
Handle: RePEc:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154213

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Web page: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/

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References

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  1. H. Imai, 1983. "On Harsanyi's solution," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 161-179, September.
  2. Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-18, May.
  3. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
  4. Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-64, July.
  5. Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 1983. "Monotonic Solutions to General Cooperative Games," Discussion Papers 567, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. E. Calvo & S. Tijs & F. Valenciano & J. Zarzuelo, 1995. "On the axiomatization of the τ-value," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 35-46, June.
  2. Carmen Herrero & Antonio Villar, 2010. "The rights egalitarian solution for NTU sharing problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 137-150, March.
  3. Arantza Estévez-Fernández & Peter Borm & M. Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro, 2014. "Nontransferable Utility Bankruptcy Games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-030/II, Tinbergen Institute.
  4. Bergantinos, G. & Casas-Mendez, B. & Fiestras-Janeiro, M.G. & Vidal-Puga, J.J., 2007. "A solution for bargaining problems with coalition structure," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 35-58, July.
  5. Gustavo Bergantiños & Balbina Casas- Méndez & Gloria Fiestras- Janeiro & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2005. "A Focal-Point Solution for Bargaining Problems with Coalition Structure," Game Theory and Information 0511006, EconWPA.
  6. LAMAS, ALEJANDRO & CHEVALIER, Philippe, 2013. "Jumping the hurdles for collaboration: fairness in operations pooling in the absence of transfer payments," CORE Discussion Papers 2013073, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  7. Hendrickx, R.L.P. & Borm, P.E.M. & Timmer, J.B., 2000. "On Convexity for NTU-Games," Discussion Paper 2000-108, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  8. Carmen Herrero & Antonio Villar, 2009. "The Rights-Egalitarian Solution for NTU Sharing Problems," Working Papers 09.01, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
  9. Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó, 2002. "The Chi-compromise value for non-transferable utility games," Computational Statistics, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 269-286, November.
  10. Judith Timmer, 2006. "The Compromise Value for Cooperative Games with Random Payoffs," Computational Statistics, Springer, vol. 64(1), pages 95-106, August.
  11. Timmer, J.B., 2000. "The Compromise Value for Cooperative Games with Random Payoffs," Discussion Paper 2000-98, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  12. Marco López-Cerdá & Guillermo Owen & Jos Potters & Carles Raffels & E. Calvo & F. Valenciano & J. Zarzuelo, 1993. "Discussion," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 36-51, December.

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