The advantage of hiding both hands: Foreign exchange intervention, ambiguity and private information
AbstractThis paper analyzes a dynamic exchange rate policy game in which the central bank has private information about its short-term exchange rate target, on the one hand, and in which the market is faced with a certain degree of ambiguity concerning the actual intervention volume, on the other. Sterilized interventions are shown to derive their effectiveness from the fact that they transmit information about the short-term exchange rate target to the market. In this respect, we provide an explanation for the presumed inconsistency between intervention secrecy and the effectiveness of the signalling channel since our model predicts that interventions will be more effective on average if the central bank retains some degree of ambiguity. Moreover, it is also shown that sterilized interventions will not exert a lasting effect on the exchange rate. Finally, we have also investigated the extent to which some political and economic parameters determine the size of the intervention bias.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-148278.
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Banking and Finance (1998) v.22, p.-
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Web page: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/
Other versions of this item:
- Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Verhagen, W.H., 1998. "The advantage of hiding both hands: Foreign exchange intervention, ambiguity and private information," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-79071, Tilburg University.
- Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Verhagen, W.H., 1997. "The Advantage of Hiding Both Hands: Foreign Exchange Intervention, Ambiguity and Private Information," Discussion Paper 1997-30, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- F31 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Exchange
- G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
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- Bofinger, Peter, 2000. "A framework for stabilizing the euro/yen/dollar triplet," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 137-151, December.
- Peter Brandner & Harald Grech, 2002. "Why Did Central Banks Intervene in the EMS? The Post-1993 Experience," WIFO Working Papers 192, WIFO.
- Peter Brandner & Harald Grech, 2002. "Why Did Central Banks Intervene in the EMS? The Post 1993 Experience," Working Papers 77, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank).
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