On the convexity of communication games
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-146634.
Date of creation: 1991
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Publication status: Published in International Journal of Game Theory (1991) v.19, p.421-430
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