On three Shapley-like solutions for cooperative games with random payoffs
AbstractThree solution concepts for cooperative games with random payoffs are introduced. These are the marginal value, the dividend value and the selector value. Inspiration for their definitions comes from several equivalent formulations of the Shapley value for cooperative TU games. An example shows that the equivalence is not preserved since these solutions can all be different for cooperative games with random payoffs. Properties are studied and a characterization on a subclass of games is provided. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-142543.
Date of creation: 2003
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Publication status: Published in International Journal of Game Theory (2003) v.32, p.595-613
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Other versions of this item:
- Judith Timmer & Peter Borm & Stef Tijs, 2004. "On three Shapley-like solutions for cooperative games with random payoffs," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 32(4), pages 595-613, 08.
- Timmer, J.B. & Borm, P.E.M. & Tijs, S.H., 2000. "On Three Shapley-Like Solutions for Cooperative Games with Random Payoffs," Discussion Paper 2000-73, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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