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Auction theory for auction design

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  • Damme, E.E.C. van

    (Tilburg University)

  • Börgers, T.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-123828.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-123828

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Web page: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/

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References

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  1. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Paul Milgrom, 2002. "Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding," Working Papers, Stanford University, Department of Economics 02004, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
  2. Maasland, E. & Onderstal, A.M., 2002. "Auctions with Financial Externalities," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 2002-22, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  3. Jehiel, Phillipe & Moldovanu, Benny, 1997. "Auctions with Downstream Interaction among Buyers," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim 97-06, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
  4. Motty Perry & Philip J. Reny, 1999. "On The Failure of the Linkage Principle in Multi-Unit Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 895-900, July.
  5. Bulow, Jeremy & Klemperer, Paul, 1996. "Auctions versus Negotiations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 86(1), pages 180-94, March.
  6. Milgrom, Paul, 1998. "Putting auction theory to work : the simultaneous ascending auction," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1986, The World Bank.
  7. Vijay Krishna & Robert Rosenthal, 1995. "Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies," Papers, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme 0056, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
  8. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1992. "Bidding Rings," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 579-99, June.
  9. Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo, 1999. "Collusion via Signalling in Open Ascending Auctions with Multiple Objects and Complementarities," Working Papers, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics 99-05, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  10. Ashenfelter, Orley, 1989. "How Auctions Work for Wine and Art," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 23-36, Summer.
  11. Maskin, Eric & Riley, John, 2000. "Asymmetric Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(3), pages 413-38, July.
  12. Wilson, Robert, 1979. "Auctions of Shares," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 93(4), pages 675-89, November.
  13. Maasland, E. & Onderstal, A.M., 2002. "Optimal Auctions with Financial Externalities," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 2002-21, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  14. Grimm, Veronika & Riedel, Frank & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 2003. "Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: the GSM spectrum auction in Germany," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 21(10), pages 1557-1569, December.
  15. Levin, Dan & Smith, James L, 1994. "Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 585-99, June.
  16. Wolfgang Pesendorfer & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1995. "The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1147, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  17. Rothkopf, Michael H & Teisberg, Thomas J & Kahn, Edward P, 1990. "Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(1), pages 94-109, February.
  18. Paul Klemperer, 2000. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Economics Series Working Papers, University of Oxford, Department of Economics 2000-W26, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  19. Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans & Charles M. Kahn, 1998. "Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 227-258.
  20. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
  21. Jehiel, Philippe & Benny Moldovanu, 1994. "Strategic Non-Participation," Discussion Paper Serie B, University of Bonn, Germany 287, University of Bonn, Germany.
  22. John McMillan, 1994. "Selling Spectrum Rights," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 145-162, Summer.
  23. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1995. "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 98wpdr, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 22 Jul 2002.
  24. Gilbert, Richard J & Newbery, David M G, 1982. "Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 514-26, June.
  25. McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions with entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 343-347.
  26. Oliver E. Williamson, 1976. "Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies -- in General and with Respect to CATV," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 73-104, Spring.
  27. Leonard, Herman B, 1983. "Elicitation of Honest Preferences for the Assignment of Individuals to Positions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 461-79, June.
  28. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John & Reny, Philip J, 1989. "Extracting the Surplus in the Common-Value Auction," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 57(6), pages 1451-59, November.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Axel Ockenfels & David Reiley & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2006. "Online Auctions," NBER Working Papers 12785, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Stefan Weishaar, 2007. "CO 2 emission allowance allocation mechanisms, allocative efficiency and the environment: a static and dynamic perspective," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 29-70, August.

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