Merger and collusion in contests
AbstractCompetition in some product markets takes the form of a contest. If some firms cooperate in such markets, they must decide how to allocate effort on each of their products and whether to reduce the number of their products in the competition. We show how this decision depends on the convexity properties of the contest success function, and we characterize conditions under which cooperation is profitable.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-112517.
Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (2002) v.158, p.563-575
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Other versions of this item:
- Steffen Huck & Kai A. Konrad & Wieland Müller, 2002. "Merger and Collusion in Contests," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 158(4), pages 563-, December.
- Huck, Steffen & Konrad, Kai A. & Müller, Wieland, 2001. "Merger and collusion in contests," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance FS IV 01-04, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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