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Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control

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Author Info

  • Germain, M.
  • Toint, Ph.
  • Tulkens, H.
  • Zeeuw, A.J. de

    (Tilburg University)

Abstract

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tilburg University in its series Open Access publications from Tilburg University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-112000.

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Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (2003) v.28, p.79-99
Handle: RePEc:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-112000

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Web page: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/

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References

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Johan Eyckmans & Henry Tulkens, 1999. "Simulating with RICE Coalitionally Stable Burden Sharing Agreements for the Climate Change Problem," CESifo Working Paper Series 228, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. GERMAIN, Marc & TULKENS, Henry & DE ZEEUW, Aart, . "Stabilité stratégique en matière de pollution internationale avec effet de stock. Le cas linéaire," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1351, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. EYCKMANS, Johan & TULKENS, Henry, 1999. "Simulating coalitionally stable burden sharing agreements for the climate change problem," CORE Discussion Papers 1999026, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. Henry Tulkens & Parkash Chander, 1997. "The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 379-401.
  5. Parkash Chander & Henry Tulkens, 1995. "A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on transfrontier pollution," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 279-293, August.
  6. Veijo Kaitala & Matti Pohjola & Olli Tahvonen, 1992. "Transboundary air pollution and soil acidification: A dynamic analysis of an acid rain game between Finland and the USSR," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 161-181, March.
  7. GERMAIN, Marc & TOINT, Philippe & TULKENS, Henry & DE ZEEUW, Aart, 1998. "Transfers to sustain core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control," CORE Discussion Papers 1998032, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  8. Frederick Ploeg & Aart Zeeuw, 1992. "International aspects of pollution control," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 117-139, March.
  9. Houba, H.E.D. & Zeeuw, A.J. de, 1992. "Strategic bargaining for the control of a dynamic system in state-space form," Discussion Paper 1992-36, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  10. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October.
  11. Zeeuw, A.J. de, 1998. "The acid rain differential game," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-77117, Tilburg University.
  12. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-94, Supplemen.
  13. Laurence Kranich & Andrés Perea & Hans Peters, 2005. "Core Concepts For Dynamic Tu Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 7(01), pages 43-61.
  14. repec:fth:louvco:9926 is not listed on IDEAS
  15. GERMAIN, Marc & VAN YPERSELE, Jean-Pascal, 1999. "Financial transfers to sustain international cooperation in the climate change framework," CORE Discussion Papers 1999036, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  16. repec:fth:louvco:9936 is not listed on IDEAS
  17. Tahvonen, Olli, 1994. "Carbon dioxide abatement as a differential game," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 685-705, December.
  18. Zeeuw, A.J. de, 1995. "Strategic bargaining for the control of a dynamic system in state-space form," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-377499, Tilburg University.
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  1. > Environmental and Natural Resource Economics > Climate economics > International agreements
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