Population-monotonicity and separability for economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of in indivisible object
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Paper provided by Maastricht University in its series Open Access publications from Maastricht University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-20044.Length:
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Economic theory (2001) v.17, p.675-692
Handle: RePEc:ner:maastr:urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-20044
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Web page: http://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/web/Home.htm
Related research
Keywords:Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Klaus, Bettina, 2001.
"Coalitional strategy-proofness in economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object,"
Open Access publications from Maastricht University
urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-20043, Maastricht University.
- Klaus, Bettina, 2001. "Coalitional Strategy-Proofness in Economies with Single-Dipped Preferences and the Assignment of an Indivisible Object," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 64-82, January.
- Hideki Mizukami & Takuma Wakayama, 2005. "Relationships between Non-Bossiness and Nash Implementability," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 05-33, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP).
- Ahmed Doghmi, 2013. "Nash Implementation in an Allocation Problem with Single-Dipped Preferences," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(1), pages 38-49, January.
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