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Coalitional strategy-proofness in economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object

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  • Klaus, Bettina

    (Maastricht University)

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Maastricht University in its series Open Access publications from Maastricht University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-20043.

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Date of creation: 2001
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Publication status: Published in Games and economic behavior (2001) v.34, p.64-82
Handle: RePEc:ner:maastr:urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-20043

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Web page: http://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/web/Home.htm

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  1. Ching, Stephen, 1992. "A simple characterization of the uniform rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 57-60, September.
  2. Sprumont, Yves, 1991. "The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 509-19, March.
  3. Klaus, Bettina, 2001. "Population-monotonicity and separability for economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of in indivisible object," Open Access publications from Maastricht University urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-20044, Maastricht University.
  4. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
  5. Lars Ehlers, 2002. "Probabilistic allocation rules and single-dipped preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 325-348.
  6. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
  7. Klaus, Bettina & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 1997. "Strategy-proof division of a private good when preferences are single-dipped," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 339-346, September.
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Cited by:
  1. Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2007. "Strategic Requirements with Indifference: Single-Peaked versus Single-Plateaued Preferences," Working Papers 325, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  2. Barberà, Salvador & Berga, Dolors & Moreno, Bernardo, 2010. "Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(5), pages 1648-1674, September.
  3. Ahmed Doghmi, 2013. "Nash Implementation in an Allocation Problem with Single-Dipped Preferences," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(1), pages 38-49, January.
  4. Shigehiro Serizawa, 2006. "Strategy-Proof and Anonymous Allocation Rules of Indivisible Goods: A New Characterization of Vickrey Allocation Rule," ISER Discussion Paper 0648, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.

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