Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems
AbstractWe consider a problem of allocating indivisible objects when agents may desire to consume more than one object and no monetary transfers are allowed. We are interested in allocation rules that satisfy desirable properties from an economic and social point of view. In addition to strategy-proofness and Pareto efficiency, we consider consistency and two solidarity properties (replacement-domination and population-monotonicity). In most of the cases, these properties are satisfied only by serially dictatorial rules.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Maastricht University in its series Open Access publications from Maastricht University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-20041.
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in International journal of game theory (2001) v.30, p.421-435
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/web/Home.htm
Other versions of this item:
- Bettina Klaus & Eiichi Miyagawa, 2002. "Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 421-435.
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Yuji Fujinaka & Takuma Wakayama, 2011.
"Secure implementation in Shapley–Scarf housing markets,"
Springer, vol. 48(1), pages 147-169, September.
- Yuji Fujinaka & Takuma Wakayama, 2008. "Secure Implementation in Shapley-Scarf Housing Markets," ISER Discussion Paper 0727, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Feb 2009.
- Papai, Szilvia, 2003. "Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(8), pages 931-959, November.
- Papai, Szilvia, 2007. "Exchange in a general market with indivisible goods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 208-235, January.
- Salvador Barberà, 2010.
"Strategy-proof social choice,"
420, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Eric Budish & Estelle Cantillon, 2012.
"The Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 102(5), pages 2237-71, August.
- Budish, Eric & Cantillon, Estelle, 2010. "The Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard," CEPR Discussion Papers 7641, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Eric Budish & Estelle Cantillon, 2012. "The Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/99376, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (J.Odekerken).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.