Choice correspondences for public goods
AbstractWe consider collective choice problems where a group of agents has to decide on the location of a public facility in a Euclidean space. A well-known solution for such problems is the coordinatewise median of the reported votes and additional fixed ballots. Instead of adding ballots, we extend the median solution by allowing set-valued outcomes. This especially applies for location problems with an even number of agents.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Maastricht University in its series Open Access publications from Maastricht University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-20040.
Date of creation: 2002
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Publication status: Published in Social choice and welfare (2002) v.19, p.127-154
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