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Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems

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  • Ehlers, Lars
  • Klaus, Bettina

    (Maastricht University)

Abstract

We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency and resource-monotonicity. The characterized rules assign the objects in a sequence of steps such that at each step there is either a dictator or two agents "trade" objects from their hierarchically specified "endowments."

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Maastricht University in its series Open Access publications from Maastricht University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-20035.

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Date of creation: 2003
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Publication status: Published in International journal of game theory (2003) v.32, p.545-560
Handle: RePEc:ner:maastr:urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-20035

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Web page: http://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/web/Home.htm

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References

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  1. Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2003. "Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 265-280, October.
  2. Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2007. "Consistent House Allocation," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 561-574, March.
  3. EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina, 2003. "Efficient Priority Rules," Cahiers de recherche 11-2003, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  4. Moulin, Herve & Thomson, William, 1988. "Can everyone benefit from growth? : Two difficulties," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 339-345, September.
  5. Ehlers, Lars & Klaus, Bettina & Papai, Szilvia, 2002. "Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 329-339, November.
  6. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sonmez, 1998. "Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 689-702, May.
  7. Haluk I. Ergin, 2002. "Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2489-2497, November.
  8. Toru Hokari, 2000. "note: The nucleolus is not aggregate-monotonic on the domain of convex games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 133-137.
  9. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Moulin, Herve, 2001. "A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 295-328, October.
  10. Ergin, Haluk I., 2000. "Consistency in house allocation problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 77-97, August.
  11. Chun, Youngsub & Thomson, William, 1988. "Monotonicity properties of bargaining solutions when applied to economics," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 11-27, February.
  12. Maniquet, Francois & Sprumont, Yves, 2000. "On resource monotonicity in the fair division problem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 68(3), pages 299-302, September.
  13. Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "House Allocation with Existing Tenants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 233-260, October.
  14. Ehlers, Lars, 2002. "Coalitional Strategy-Proof House Allocation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 298-317, August.
  15. Lars Ehlers, 2002. "Resource-monotonic allocation when preferences are single-peaked," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 113-131.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Fuhito Kojima & M. Utku Ünver, 2010. "The 'Boston' School-Choice Mechanism," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 729, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 08 Oct 2010.
  2. Sophie Bade, 2011. "Pareto-Optimal Assignments by Hierarchical Exchange," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2011_11, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  3. Sonmez, Tayfun & Utku Unver, M., 2005. "House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 153-185, July.
  4. Ehlers, Lars & Klaus, Bettina, 2006. "Efficient priority rules," Open Access publications from Maastricht University urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-20030, Maastricht University.
  5. Yuji Fujinaka & Takuma Wakayama, 2011. "Secure implementation in Shapley–Scarf housing markets," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 48(1), pages 147-169, September.
  6. Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2011. "Local and Global Consistency Properties for Student Placement," Working Papers 538, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  7. Quesada, Antonio, 2009. "Allocation of objects with conditional property rights," MPRA Paper 19469, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Onur Kesten, 2009. "Coalitional strategy-proofness and resource monotonicity for house allocation problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 17-21, March.
  9. Juan Moreno-Ternero & John E. Roemer, 2004. "Impartiality and Priority. Part 2: A Characterization with Solidarity," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1477B, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised May 2005.
  10. Kesten, Onur, 2006. "On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 127(1), pages 155-171, March.
  11. Dur, Umut, 2012. "A Characterization of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism for the School Choice Problem," MPRA Paper 41366, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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