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Tax liability side equivalence in gift-exchange labor markets

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  • Riedl, Arno

    (Maastricht University)

  • Tyran, Jean-Robert

Abstract

Tax Liability Side Equivalence (tax LSE) claims that the statutory incidence of a tax is irrelevant for its economic incidence. In gift-exchange labor markets, firms provide a gift to workers by paying high wages, and workers reciprocate by providing high efforts. Tax LSE is theoretically predicted to hold in gift-exchange markets if workers' effort choices exclusively depend on the net wage, but breaks down if they partially depend on the gross wage paid to workers. We experimentally test tax LSE in a gift-exchange market and find that it holds surprisingly well.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Maastricht University in its series Open Access publications from Maastricht University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-16452.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Publication status: Published in Journal of public economics (2005) v.89, p.2369-2382
Handle: RePEc:ner:maastr:urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-16452

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Web page: http://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/web/Home.htm

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  1. Pisauro, Giuseppe, 1991. "The effect of taxes on labour in efficiency wage models," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 329-345, December.
  2. Borck, R. & Engelmann, D. & Müller, W. & Normann, H.T., 2002. "Tax liability side equivalence in an experimental posted offer market," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-112548, Tilburg University.
  3. Akerlof, George A, 1982. "Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 97(4), pages 543-69, November.
  4. Renner, Elke & Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2004. "Price rigidity in customer markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 55(4), pages 575-593, December.
  5. Rainald Borck & Dirk Engelmann & Wieland Müller & Hans-Theo Normann, 2002. "Tax Liability-Side Equivalence in Experimental Posted-Offer Markets," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 68(3), pages 672-682, January.
  6. Fehr, Ernst & Kirchsteiger, Georg & Riedl, Arno, 1998. "Gift exchange and reciprocity in competitive experimental markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-34, January.
  7. Alan S. Blinder, 1988. "The Challenge of High Unemployment," NBER Working Papers 2489, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Fehr, Ernst & Kirchsteiger, Georg & Riedl, Arno, 1998. "Gift exchange and reciprocity in competitive experimental markets1," Open Access publications from Maastricht University urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-16456, Maastricht University.
  9. Campbell, Carl M, III & Kamlani, Kunal S, 1997. "The Reasons for Wage Rigidity: Evidence from a Survey of Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(3), pages 759-89, August.
  10. Rudolf KERSCHBAMER & Georg KIRCHSTEIGER, 1997. "Theoretically Robust But Empirically Invalid? An Experimental Investigation into Tax Equivalence," Vienna Economics Papers vie9704, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
  11. Fehr, Ernst & Kirchsteiger, Georg & Riedl, Arno, 1993. "Does fairness prevent market clearing? An experimental investigation," Open Access publications from Maastricht University urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-16460, Maastricht University.
  12. Picard, P.M. & Toulemonde, E., 1999. "On the Equivalence of Taxes Paid by Employers and Employees," Papers 215, Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales.
  13. Lockwood, Ben & Manning, Alan, 1993. "Wage setting and the tax system theory and evidence for the United Kingdom," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 1-29, August.
  14. Jordi Brandts & Gary Charness, 2004. "Do Labour Market Conditions Affect Gift Exchange? Some Experimental Evidence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(497), pages 684-708, 07.
  15. Fehr, Ernst, et al, 1998. "When Social Norms Overpower Competition: Gift Exchange in Experimental Labor Markets," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(2), pages 324-51, April.
  16. Laszlo Goerke, 2002. "Statutory and economic incidence of labour taxes," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 9(1), pages 17-20.
  17. Ruffle, Bradley J., 2005. "Tax and subsidy incidence equivalence theories: experimental evidence from competitive markets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(8), pages 1519-1542, August.
  18. R. Lynn Hannan & John H. Kagel & Donald V. Moser, 2002. "Partial Gift Exchange in an Experimental Labor Market: Impact of Subject Population Differences, Productivity Differences, and Effort Requests on Behavior," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(4), pages 923-951, October.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Rupert Sausgruber & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2008. "Tax Salience, Voting, and Deliberation," Working Papers 2009-25, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
  2. Blumkin, Tomer & Ruffle, Bradley J. & Ganun, Yosef, 2012. "Are income and consumption taxes ever really equivalent? Evidence from a real-effort experiment with real goods," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(6), pages 1200-1219.
  3. Paul J. Healy, 2007. "Group Reputations, Stereotypes, and Cooperation in a Repeated Labor Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(5), pages 1751-1773, December.
  4. Casoria Fortuna & Riedl Arno, 2012. "Experimental labor markets and policy considerations: Incomplete contracts and macroeconomic aspects," Research Memoranda 058, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
  5. Konrad, Kai A. & Morath, Florian & Müller, Wieland, 2010. "Taxation and market power," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" SP II 2010-07, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  6. Sausgruber, Rupert & Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2011. "Are we taxing ourselves?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 164-176.
  7. Arno Riedl, 2009. "Behavioral and Experimental Economics Can Inform Public Policy: Some Thoughts," CESifo Working Paper Series 2902, CESifo Group Munich.
  8. Bracht, Juergen & Feltovich, Nick, 2009. "Whatever you say, your reputation precedes you: Observation and cheap talk in the trust game," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(9-10), pages 1036-1044, October.
  9. Ben Heijdra & Jenny Ligthart, 2009. "Labor tax reform, unemployment, and search," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 82-104, February.

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