Strategy-proof division of a private good when preferences are single-dipped
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Maastricht University in its series Open Access publications from Maastricht University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-12256.
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Economics letters (1997) v.55, p.339-346
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Other versions of this item:
- Klaus, Bettina & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 1997. "Strategy-proof division of a private good when preferences are single-dipped," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 339-346, September.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Thomson William, 1994. "Consistent Solutions to the Problem of Fair Division When Preferences Are Single-Peaked," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 219-245, August.
- Thomson, William, 1993.
"The replacement principle in public good economies with single-peaked preferences,"
Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 31-36.
- Thomson, W., 1992. "The Replacement Principle in Public Good Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences," RCER Working Papers 340, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Papai, Szilvia, 1996. "Strategyproof Allocation of a Single Object," Working Papers 936, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Sprumont, Yves, 1991. "The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 509-19, March.
- Ugur Ozdemir & M. Sanver, 2007. "Dictatorial domains in preference aggregation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 61-76, January.
- Ahmed Doghmi, 2013. "Nash Implementation in an Allocation Problem with Single-Dipped Preferences," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(1), pages 38-49, January.
- Kaminski, Marek M., 2006. "Parametric rationing methods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 115-133, January.
- Shurojit Chatterji & Arunava Sen, 2011.
Springer, vol. 46(2), pages 255-282, February.
- Walter Bossert & Hans Peters, 2013.
Cahiers de recherche
04-2013, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Islam, Jamal & Mohajan, Haradhan & Moolio, Pahlaj, 2010. "Median voter model cannot solve all the problems of voting system," MPRA Paper 50696, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 22 Feb 2011.
- Miguel Angel Ballester & Guillaume Haeringer, 2006.
"A Characterization of Single-Peaked Preferences,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
656.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Klaus, Bettina, 2001.
"Coalitional strategy-proofness in economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object,"
Open Access publications from Maastricht University
urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-20043, Maastricht University.
- Klaus, Bettina, 2001. "Coalitional Strategy-Proofness in Economies with Single-Dipped Preferences and the Assignment of an Indivisible Object," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 64-82, January.
- Miguel Ballester & Guillaume Haeringer, 2011. "A characterization of the single-peaked domain," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 305-322, February.
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