Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems

Contents:

Author Info

  • Ehlers, Lars
  • Peters, Hans

    (Maastricht University)

  • Storcken, Ton

    (Maastricht University)

Abstract

In voting problems where agents have well behaved (Lipschitz continuous) utility functions on a multidimensional space of alternatives, a voting rule is threshold strategy-proof if any agent can only obtain a limited utility gain by not voting for a most preferred alternative,given that the number of agents is large enough. For anonymous voting rules it is shown that this condition is not only implied by but in fact equivalent to the influence of any single agent reducing to zero as the number of agents grows. If there are at least five agents, the mean rule (taking the average vote) is shown to be the unique anonymous and unanimous voting rule that meets a lower bound with respect to the number of agents needed to obtain threshold strategy-proofness.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://arno.unimaas.nl/show.cgi?fid=8984
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Maastricht University in its series Open Access publications from Maastricht University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-12233.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Games and economic behavior (2004) v.49, p.103-116
Handle: RePEc:ner:maastr:urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-12233

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/web/Home.htm

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Jose M. Cordoba & Peter J. Hammond, 1998. "Asymptotically Strategy-Proof Walrasian Exchange," Working Papers 98005, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
  2. Gary-Bobo, Robert J. & Jaaidane, Touria, 2000. "Polling mechanisms and the demand revelation problem," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 203-238, May.
  3. Roberts, Donald John & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1976. "The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Exchange Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 44(1), pages 115-27, January.
  4. James Schummer, 1999. "Almost-dominant Strategy Implementation," Discussion Papers 1278, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. Zhou, Lin, 1991. "Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 107-19, January.
  6. Gul, Faruk & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1992. "Asymptotic Efficiency in Large Exchange Economies with Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1273-92, November.
  7. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
  8. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-31, July.
  9. Pazner, Elisha A & Wesley, Eugene, 1978. "Cheatproofness Properties of the Plurality Rule in Large Societies," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(1), pages 85-91, February.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Maus,Stefan & Peters,Hans & Storcken,Ton, 2005. "Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability," Research Memoranda 009, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
  2. Donald Campbell & Jerry Kelly, 2009. "Gains from manipulating social choice rules," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 349-371, September.
  3. Régis Renault & Alain Trannoy, 2011. "Assessing the extent of strategic manipulation: the average vote example," SERIEs, Spanish Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 497-513, December.
  4. Marchese, Carla & Montefiori, Marcello, 2011. "Strategy versus sincerity in mean voting," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 93-102, February.
  5. Carla Marchese & Marcello Montefiori, 2008. "Voting the public expenditure: an experiment," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena 020, University of Siena.
  6. Salvador Barberà, 2010. "Strategy-proof social choice," Working Papers 420, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  7. Marchese, Carla & Montefiori, Marcello, 2005. "Mean voting rule and strategical behavior: an experiment," POLIS Working Papers 49, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ner:maastr:urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-12233

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (J.Odekerken).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.