Efficiency in uncertain cooperative games
AbstractA contingent contract in a transferable utility game under uncertainty specifies an outcome for each possible state. It is assumed that coalitions evaluate these contracts by considering the minimal possible excesses. A main question of the paper concerns the existence and characterization of efficient contracts. It is shown that they exist if and only if the set of possible coalitions contains a balanced subset. Moreover, a characterization of values that result in efficient contracts in the case of minimally balanced collections is provided.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Maastricht University in its series Open Access publications from Maastricht University with number urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-12231.
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Mathematical social sciences (2005) v.50, p.12-23
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Web page: http://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/web/Home.htm
Other versions of this item:
- BOSSERT, Walter & DERKS, Jean & PETERS, Hans, 2001. "Efficiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games," Cahiers de recherche 2001-14, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Bossert, W. & Derks, J. & Peters, H., 2001. "Efficiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games," Cahiers de recherche 2001-14, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Bossert,Walter & Derks,Jean & Peters,Hans, 2001. "Efficiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games," Research Memoranda 002, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hans Peters & Walter Bossert, 2002.
"Efficient solutions to bargaining problems with uncertain disagreement points,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 489-502.
- Bossert, Walter & Peters, Hans, 2001. "Efficient solutions to bargaining problems with uncertain disagreement points," Open Access publications from Maastricht University urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-12243, Maastricht University.
- Bossert, Walter & Nosal, Ed & Sadanand, Venkatraman, 1996. "Bargaining under Uncertainty and the Monotone Path Solutions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 173-189, June.
- Bossert, Walter & Peters, Hans, 2001.
"Minimax Regret and Efficient Bargaining under Uncertainty,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 1-10, January.
- Bossert, Walter & Peters, Hans, 2001. "Minimax regret and efficient bargaining under uncertainty," Open Access publications from Maastricht University urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-12241, Maastricht University.
- Walter Bossert & Hans Peters, . "Minimax Regret and Efficient Bargaining under Uncertainty," Discussion Papers 98/8, University of Nottingham, School of Economics.
- Derks, Jean & Peters, Hans, 1998.
"Orderings, excess functions, and the nucleolus,"
Open Access publications from Maastricht University
urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-12244, Maastricht University.
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