Follower payoffs in symmetric duopoly games
AbstractThis paper compares the leader and follower payoff in a duopoly game, as they arise in sequential play, with the Nash payoff in simultaneous play. If the game is symmetric, has a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium, and players' payoffs are monotonic in the opponent's choice along their own best reply function, then the follower payoff is either higher than the leader payoff, or even lower than in the simultaneous game. This gap for the possible follower payoff had not been observed in earlier duopoly models of endogenous timing.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by London School of Economics and Political Science in its series Open Access publications from London School of Economics and Political Science with number http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/27651/.
Date of creation: Jul 2010
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Publication status: Published in Games and economic behavior (2010-07) v.69, p.512-516
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-06-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2011-06-11 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-GTH-2011-06-11 (Game Theory)
- NEP-IND-2011-06-11 (Industrial Organization)
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- Tasnádi, Attila, 2012. "Endogenous Timing of Moves in Bertrand-Edgeworth Triopolies," MPRA Paper 47610, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Marco Marini & Giorgio Rodano, 2012. "Sequential vs Collusive Payoffs in Symmetric Duopoly Games," DIAG Technical Reports 2012-06, Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza".
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