Evolutionary Regulation: from CPI-X towards Contestability
AbstractRegulation is a long-term game. To minimize transition costs and to ensure the viability of modern regulatory instruments like yardstick competition, it is important to acknowledge the historical industry structure and market developments. Likewise it is important to plan regulatory trajectories for the immediate and more distant futures. In this position paper, we stress the delicate nature of regulation and in particular the evolutionary context of regulation, where even the yardstick competition is seen as a transition step from simple CPI-X revenue caps towards pseudo-contestable markets.
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Date of creation: 2004
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