Judicial policy lines in the criminal sanctioning of environmental offenses: an empirical study
AbstractWe analyze judicial policy lines concerning criminal environmental sanctioning using a unique European dataset of individual criminal cases, including case-specific information on offenses and offenders. We investigate policy choices made by criminal judges in lower courts as well as the relevant court of appeal. The sanctioning policy of judges proofs to be varied as well as consistent. Judges decide to postpone convictions for cases they deem less important. They carefully balance effective and suspended sanctions, in general using them as substitutes, but in specific cases opting to use them cumulatively. Overall, judges in lower courts balance environmental and classic criminal law and aim at protecting individuals and their possessions as well as the environment.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in its series Open Access publications from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven with number urn:hdl:123456789/321997.
Date of creation: Nov 2011
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.kuleuven.be
Other versions of this item:
- Carole M. BILLIET & Thomas BLONDIAU & Sandra ROUSSEAU, 2011. "Judicial policy lines in the criminal sanctioning of environmental offenses: an empirical study," Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers ces11.29, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Rousseau, Sandra & Telle, K., 2010.
"On the existence of the optimal fine for environmental crime,"
Open Access publications from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
urn:hdl:123456789/288246, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
- Rousseau, Sandra & Telle, Kjetil, 2010. "On the existence of the optimal fine for environmental crime," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 329-337, December.
- Levy, Gilat, 2003.
CEPR Discussion Papers
3948, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gilat Levy, 2003. "Careerist Judges," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 457, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Levy, Gilat, 2005. "Careerist judges," Open Access publications from London School of Economics and Political Science http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/, London School of Economics and Political Science.
- Rousseau, Sandra, 2009. "Empirical Analysis of Sanctions for Environmental Offenses," International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, now publishers, vol. 3(3), pages 161-194, December.
- Thomas BLONDIAU & Sandra ROUSSEAU, 2009. "The impact of judicial objective function on the enforcement of environmental standards," Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers ces09.21, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën.
- Fon, Vincy & Parisi, Francesco, 2006. "Judicial precedents in civil law systems: A dynamic analysis," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 519-535, December.
- Rasmusen, E., 1993.
"Judicial Legitimacy as a Repeated Game,"
93-017, Indiana - Center for Econometric Model Research.
- Rousseau Sandra & Billiet Carole, 2005. "How to determine fining behaviour in court? Game theoretical and empirical analysis," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0510, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Carl Demeyere).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.